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Russian Federation: Executive Branch 
By Susan Cavan 
 
THE FALL OF 2004 
Wither the President? 
President Putin has proved quite a surprise this fall.  After the series of terrorist 
attacks in Russia in August and September, when one might have expected to 
hear him vow vengeance for the victims of terrorism, Putin called in a group of 
foreign journalists and academics and announced political reforms. Gone are the 
daggers for soldiers at the front line in Chechnya, now the President is offering 
up Inspectors General to assert the power vertical. 
 
Granted, stripping the legislature even of a veneer of political opposition through 
changes to electoral procedures and attempting to re-subordinate the regions 
through de facto direct appointment of local leaderships appear as authoritarian, 
perhaps pre-planned measures meant to consolidate executive power in a 
siloviki-heavy presidency, but the regional initiatives, especially given the 
reaction they received at home and abroad, resemble nothing so much as the 
wishful thinking of Gorbachev¹s land privatization decrees of the early 1990s – 
intriguing to western ears (granted for very different reasons), but largely 
unenforceable in the hinterland.  Will the role of the security services, and more 
importantly their investment in the current political arrangement, lead to a 
significantly different outcome?  Possibly.  Assuming, that is, that the FSB hasn¹t 
been subject to the same disintegrative trends that have struck every other 
former Soviet institution from the Armed Forces and Special Forces to the 
Communist Party and Trade Unions.  
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The security services would have a lot of work to do to maintain a friendly 
regime, even Putin's.  Their portfolio suddenly would expand to encompass not 
only "managing" the population to keep it in line with the state's political agenda, 
but now, also protecting it from a no-longer-imaginary terrorist foe.  Lest one 
underestimate this task, Beslan serves as a terrible reminder of the ease of 
access and mobility terrorists can have in Russia, and all of the recent incidents 
are grim evidence of the danger of rampant corruption.  Their effort might be 
alleviated by the installation of friendly regimes in the states along the border, a 
buffer, of sorts (yes, a very familiar concept).  
 
So, where is President Putin on all this?  He has announced his political reforms, 
which may or may not be enacted.  There have been no further arrests, no 
physical force response to the terrorist attacks.  The Presidential Representative 
to the Caucasus, Dmitri Kozak, has discovered pervasive corruption in southern 
Russia, (1) and despite military bluster about the use of force in states of the 
FSU, Russia has suffered political defeats in its attempts to meddle in the 
Ukrainian election and Abkhazia, while still in play with a political settlement likely 
to favor Russian interests, represents another political thorn in Russia's side; a 
thorn that until recently stung only Georgia. 
 
Vats of ink have been spilled over the direction of a Putin/siloviki-led Russian 
state.  Recently however, questions about the strength of Putin's leadership and 
of the central authorities in general have emerged from the late summer's acts of 
terrorism.  Perhaps only now, the blowback from the decision to reignite a war in 
the south to stave off the prosecution of an outgoing regime can be seen as the 
hopeless, selfish muddle it truly was. 
 
Ukraine now finds itself facing a similar scenario to the one that propelled Putin 
to power:  an oligarch-rich regime with heavy, criminal business and political 
baggage is slinking out of public life but trying desperately to install a new 
leadership, one that will not pursue criminal prosecutions or seek retaliation 
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against the previous administration.  Putin's simpatico and support for the 
outgoing group and their chosen successors may have been understandable.  
His reaction to the popular Ukrainian response to this transparent attempt to 
circumvent the democratic process however, is pure, unadulterated Putin. 
 
Speaking at a summit in Ankara, Turkey, Putin reiterated his claims that 
machinations by western government were responsible for the failure of properly 
rigged elections to produce their anticipated results:  When asked about the 
situation in Ukraine, Putin decried the attempts to "tailor" existing laws for the 
benefit of a particular political force (isn't that rich?).  (2) 
 
"I do not want to see a divided EuropeŠinto westerners and easterners, into first 
and second [class] people, where first [class] people can live by democratic and 
stable laws, but second [class] people are, figuratively speaking, people with 
black political skin, and a kind but strict boss in a corkwood helmet will point out 
the political expediency by which they should live.  And if, God forbid, an 
un[grateful] aborigine objects, he will be punished with a bomb or missile club, 
just as it happened in Belgrade.  And that I think is absolutely unacceptable.  Just 
as it is absolutely unacceptable to threaten people and leave them no choice, 
where a political leader says that no matter what the outcome of the election is, 
we will seize power anyway, including by force."  (3) 
 
To parse that statement, apparently, the European/Eurasian states with less 
experience in democratic governance are segmented into second class citizens 
(Putin's use of overt racial characterizations is outlandish and best passed over), 
and those countries with longer traditions of democratic rule (first class states), 
should they attempt to assist in the democratic transition of their neighbors by 
monitoring electoral procedures and questioning corrupt practices are exhibiting 
"colonial" behavior.  Should the leadership of a state in transition to democracy 
(an aborigine?) decide to launch a campaign of displacement and possible 
genocide against a segment of its population (thus, demonstrating ingratitude?), 
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"western" or "first class state" response or preemption is unacceptable. Putin's 
rhetoric clearly propelled him to finish with a flourish on the need to respect 
electoral outcomes – unless, of course, parliamentary, judicial and external 
judgments about fraud in the conduct of elections is a form of force for Putin. 
 
To be fair, Putin's rather clouded outburst on western interference likely was 
motivated by the change in the west's "wink and a nod" response to elections 
across the FSU and in Russia (in addition to non-electoral based "transfers of 
power") in recent years.  Why now, when Russia has so much on its hands, 
would the west insist on above board procedures?  The possibility of actual 
popular action and mass-based demonstrations, as we've seen in Ukraine, are 
suspect to Putin, and must, therefore, be the result of western interference, a plot 
to destabilize Russia.  With a little calculation, perhaps Putin and other leaders 
would recognize that a stable, truly democratic Russia would serve greater 
interests, and would likewise prove a reliable and valuable partner against a 
mutually-acknowledged terrorist enemy. 
 
Source Notes: 
 
(1) TAR-TASS, 1302 GMT, 8 Dec 04; BBC Monitoring via ISI Emerging Markets 
Database. 
(2) Remarks by President Vladimir Putin in Ankara, Turkey, Channel One, 
Vremya News, 6 Dec 04; Official Kremlin International broadcast via Lexis-Nexis. 
(3) Ibid. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Security Services 
By Eric Beene 
 
More insight has been gained this month into the final look of Russian¹s reformed 
Federal Security Service (FSB).  President Putin formally directed its 
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restructuring last July, although it appears the process was begun the summer 
before with the re-subordination of the Border Guard Service from the Interior 
Ministry to the FSB.  Announcements and analysis of who now occupies which 
seat in the leadership of the security services, legislative changes, and increased 
funding for selected parts of the organization shed more light on the arc of 
³reform² in Russia and give food for thought on its future. 
 
Now that the music appears to have stopped within the FSB and everyone has 
chosen a chair, it is worth reviewing who sits where.  To review, FSB head 
Nikolai Patrushev now has four deputies (previously eleven).  Patrushev¹s two 
senior deputies are Colonel-General Vladimir Pronichev and Lieutenant-General 
Sergei Smirnov.  Smirnov, Patrushev¹s right-hand man and most intimate 
adviser, has been highlighted as Patrushev¹s likely replacement should the latter 
move on to other administrative posts.  Smirnov¹s experience as head of the 
FSB¹s own Security Service has given him valuable insight into the Kremlin 
network and designates him as ³one to watch² for the future.  Pronichev is Chief 
of the Border Service and, not surprisingly, a friend of Patrushev.  He has been 
hailed as a very effective manager who is successfully, if slowly, reforming his 
department. Patrushev¹s two regular deputies are Lieutenant-General 
Vyacheslav Ushakov (also with secretary status) and Lieutenant-General 
Vladimir Anisimov.  Prior to this posting, Ushakov rose to head the Operative 
Information Coordination Office (UKOI) of the Analysis, Forecast and Strategic 
Planning Department (DAPSI) under then-FSB director Vladimir Putin—a clear 
indication of Putin¹s trust, and a valuable position with ties to the Russian 
intelligence community, a point discussed in more detail later.  Anisimov is 
personally quite close to Patrushev, although little else is known of the man.  He 
does, however, have control over considerable capabilities of the department. (1) 
 
The rest of the FSB leadership, though reduced in status to service chiefs 
instead of department heads, remains largely unchanged, with one notable 
exception.  As with many other of the former departments within the FSB, the 
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Department for Defense of Constitutional State System and Counter-Terrorism 
was re-designated as a service, with Alexander Bragin, former head of the FSB 
in Chelyabinsk, as its head since summer of 2003.  Within this service, however, 
a new department has been created:  the Department for Countering 
International Terrorism.  Appointed to direct this operation is Major-General Yuri 
Sapunov, former head of the FSB in the Astrakhan region.  If the name sounds 
familiar, it is probably from his involvement in the state¹s efforts in Chechnya, and 
the FSB¹s use of severe counter-terror tactics in the region.  With this 
appointment, Sapunov is hailed as ³the chief Russian fighter against bin Laden.² 
(2) 
 
At the end of November, members of the Duma met to consider a new counter-
terrorism bill that would significantly change the way the state responds to 
terrorist incidents.  Among the provisions, it allows government agents to 
negotiate with terrorists ³for the purpose of saving lives or preventing injury, 
protecting material valuables, or identifying possibilities for stopping a terrorist 
attack without the use of force."  This marks a notable departure from President 
Putin¹s policy of no negotiations, but it limits these negotiations to essentially life-
saving measures.  The bill also discusses the role of the Federal Anti-Terrorism 
Commission, discussed previously in this column.  It draws the chain of 
command from the regional anti-terrorism commanders directly to the FSB, not 
through the states¹ regional leadership.  It specifies that "[t]he Federal Security 
Service (FSB) is unequivocally defined as playing the leading role in carrying out 
measures aimed at preventing terrorist activity," removing any confusion whether 
regional leaders, elected or appointed, are part of the anti-terrorism chain of 
command.  (3)  A final significant element of this legislation is the introduction of 
³terrorist threat modes,² or TTMs.  These include ³terrorist danger mode, counter-
terrorist operation mode, [and] state of emergency mode,² with the latter being 
the most severe.  A local on-scene commander has the authority to declare the 
appropriate TTM.  One of the implications of a TTM is restricted or even banned 
media access to the scene.  ³The [local] leader decides how and to what extent 
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the public will be informed about a terrorist attack, and can even deny journalists 
any access to the operation zone.²  (4) Yet another implication is a temporary 
reduction of civil liberties, including stepped-up identification checks, phone and 
e-mail monitoring, and restrictions on public gatherings.  While there is a 60-day 
limit on a TTM declaration, commanders have fairly wide authority to declare 
such measures, even in anticipation of an event.  (5)  Two of the more troubling 
elements of this legislation, should it pass, are the opportunities for abuse, 
especially regarding a TTM declaration simply to prevent public demonstrations 
against the government, and the lack of public accountability for its use, since the 
chain of command no longer includes elected leaders.  While clearly intended to 
tighten the command and control during a terrorism event, the legislation also 
smacks of old Soviet ways. 
 
A final noteworthy announcement concerns the restructuring and increased 
funding for the Border Guard Service (BGS), led by Colonel-General Vladimir 
Pronichev.  The BGS announced the details of its own reform program, ³State 
Border of the Russian Federation in 2003-2010."  This program plans what it 
calls a three-phase program, with the first phase focused on enhanced quality of 
life initiatives for the border guards and their families, the second phase focused 
on improved communications within the department, with a real-time picture of 
border status sent from the regions to a centralized control station at the 
Lubyanka, and a third phase that improves and modernizes the hardware and 
equipment used to monitor the borders.  The goal is enhanced border security in 
the Caucasus, Central Asia (Kazakhstan), the Baltic States, and the border with 
Ukraine by 2011, at an estimated total cost of 60 billion rubles.  (6)  As the 
Caucasus remains the most critical region, that area will obtain priority in the 
short term, with 14.8 billion rubles required by 2006 to build dozens of new 
cantonments and detachment commands in the region (many already under 
construction), a training center in Stavropol for standardized training, and new or 
improved roads between outposts.  (7) Perhaps realizing that some lawmakers 
may be reluctant to redistribute so much money so late in the state¹s budget 
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cycle, President Putin himself has been emphasizing the need for this reform, 
appearing in a well-reported meeting with senior FSB leadership.  Perhaps also 
realizing the need to change a fundamental mindset in his most trusted of 
departments, he emphasized the importance of border security:  ³[A]ny errors on 
the border have a negative effect on the entire system of national security.²  
Indeed, this will demand that the border guards themselves, long accustomed to 
relying on military personnel to help protect the borders, assume greater 
responsibility.  (8) 
 
The hope is for the creation of a more effective layered defense highlighted by 
close cooperation between the government organizations involved in guarding 
the country¹s borders—the Defense Ministry, local police, regional authorities, 
and even local citizens.  To help such this effective defense, the BGS is 
attempting to create a more professional force, one less reliant on conscripts.  In 
the words of Colonel-General Pronichev, ³The Border Service [already] has 
abandoned 6,000 conscripts. At the moment, we are handing over 2,300 
additional servicemen to the Defense Ministry, while next year we'll abandon 
10,000 conscripts. Thus we'll be gradually ensuring the approach of a 
professional border service.² (9) 
 
These reform efforts, especially the reform of the BGS, appear to describe a new 
chapter in President Putin¹s process of change, previously marked by his 
attempts to enhance the vertical of power, his blind faith in the FSB, whose 
forces have proved time and again they are incapable of protecting the nation 
against terrorists, and silovikization—Putin¹s habit of inserting well-known former 
KGB personnel into positions of power throughout the government and industry.  
In this instance, he has not simply inserted his favored personnel into a top 
leadership position in the Border Guards Service; he has taken the entire BGS 
away from the Interior Ministry and transplanted it directly into the FSB.  Only 
now that it is well imbedded in his favored ministry does he ask to increase 
radically its budget and make the long-needed improvements.  In this scenario, 
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Putin has established a staff of trusted agents to supervise what is possibly one 
of the most significant organizational reform efforts in his tenure.  If he is 
successful—if the money is re-allocated, if the advertised enhancements are 
made, and if this reform effort is able to show any kind of enhanced capability, 
helping to make Russia more secure—he may have established a new model for 
future organizational reform:  incorporate the target organization into the FSB 
first, then begin the reform process. 
 
The scale of change in this case is large, and it is unlikely real progress will be 
evident before 2006 or 2007.  By that time, it may be too late to undertake major 
change in any other organization using a similar technique.  However, there may 
be other, smaller organizations ripe for change that could follow this model in the 
meantime and possibly even show improvement sooner.  Perhaps one of the 
next candidates for this process is the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR).  This 
organization, even under its current head, Lieutenant-General Sergei Lebedev, 
has yet to recover fully from the break up of the Soviet Union, which saw 
territories formerly considered ³interior² become ³foreign.²  (10)  Reform of the 
SVR could also fall under the aegis of counter-terrorism as intelligence and 
intelligence-sharing between countries is crucial to pre-empting acts of terrorism 
originating abroad.  As President Putin continues to highlight the involvement of 
non-Russians in acts of terrorism within Russia, this could be a relatively easy 
³sell² to the rest of the apparatus.  And with a deputy director in the FSB having 
the experience of Lieutenant-General Ushakov, the management pieces appear 
to be already in place.  The irony is that, since such an effort would probably be 
classified (beyond what the newspapers are permitted to report), barring a leak, 
most of us would not be aware of such an attempt until after it has already 
proven itself. 
  
Source Notes: 
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(1) Alexander Sokolov, ³The FSB Has Been Transformed,² Kommersant, 15 Nov 
04; What the Papers Say - Defense and Security via ISI Emerging Markets; ³FSB 
Reform,² CCPR - Russia Federal Politics, Center for Current Political Research, 
23 Nov 04 via ISI Emerging Markets; and Andrei Skrobot, ³The FSB Appoints A 
New Person To Fight Osama Bin Laden,² Nezavisimaya gazeta, 5 Nov 04; What 
the Papers Say via Lexis-Nexis. 
(2) Andrei Skrobot, ³The FSB Appoints A New Person To Fight Osama Bin 
Laden,² Nezavisimaya gazeta, 5 Nov 04; What the Papers Say via Lexis-Nexis 
and Roman Kupchinsky, ³Analysis: New Proposals On the Russian Antiterrorism 
Front,² Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 16 Nov 04. 
(3) Yuri Politov, ³The Duma Aims to Permit Negotiation With Terrorists,² Izvestia, 
2 Dec 04; What the Papers Say via ISI Emerging Markets. 
(4) Ibid. 
(5) Suzanna Farizova, ³The Terrorist Threat Mode Front,² Kommersant, 1 Dec 
04; What the Papers Say via ISI Emerging Markets. 
(6) ³Russia to Spend About R60bn to Reinforce Its Borders With Former CIS 
States,² ITAR-TASS, 29 Nov 04; BBC Monitoring via ISI Emerging Markets. 
(7) Ivan Safronov, ³A Race of Barriers,² Kommersant, 2 Dec 04; What the Papers 
Say via ISI Emerging Markets. 
(8) Ibid. 
(9) Lieutenant Colonel Eduard Ragimov, ³Vladimir Pronichev: The Border Service 
to Be Professional,² Granitsa Rossii, No. 44, 24-30 Nov 04; What the Papers Say 
- Defense and Security via ISI Emerging Markets and ibid. 
(10) ³FSB Reform,² CCPR - Russia Federal Politics, Center for Current Political 
Research, 23 Nov 04 via ISI Emerging Markets; and Gordon Bennett, Vladimir 
Putin and Russia¹s Special Services, Conflict Studies Research Center, Surrey, 
England, Aug 2002. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Foreign Relations 
By Rebecca Mulder 
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³Vstavay! Rise up!² 
Ukraine prepares for a new runoff election putatively to be held 26 December.  In 
response, the Russian Parliament has adopted a resolution accusing the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the European 
Union of fomenting unrest in Ukraine. Throughout the entire disputed Ukrainian 
election process, President Putin has continued to back both President Leonid 
Kuchma and his chosen successor, Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovich over the 
opposition leader, Viktor Yushchenko. 
 
The popular response to the election results has exposed stark divisions that not 
only reflect divergent views within Ukraine but between Russia and the West. 
The United States and many European countries have expressed the desire that 
Ukraine have a free and fair electoral process; the Kremlin has been opposed to 
a new runoff election, wishing to see the widely-criticized vote for Yanukovich 
certified. Although largely unsupported by the actual positions of the candidates, 
support for Yanukovich or Yushchenko mirrors an east-west split. 
 
The Supreme Court¹s decision to throw out the election results is a victory for 
those who saw the massive electoral violations (which included intimidation, 
voting restrictions, misuse of absentee ballots, even pens with invisible ink) as an 
erosion of the fundamental right of the Ukrainian people freely and fairly to elect 
the president of their choice. Yanukovich represents Ukraine¹s Russian-leaning 
ruling elite and Yushchenko, who has promised to turn Ukraine towards NATO 
membership and the E.U., represents western aspirations. The Supreme Court¹s 
decision, if implemented, would enable Ukraine to move forward within the 
framework of its constitution and toward more transparency in its governance. 
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Kuchma suggested that Yanukovich should withdraw from the election, a move 
that could complicate Yushchenko¹s efforts to achieve a legitimate victory.  
Kuchma, in his waning days as president, is attempting to shift greater power to 
Parliament, thus weakening a presidency that Yushchenko might inherit. (1) In 
response to the mass demonstration in Kiev, Kuchma commented cynically, 
³Revolutions are prepared by dreamers. And I always recall 1917: They are 
carried out by fanatics, and they are exploited by scoundrels.² (2) 
 
The popular response in Ukraine, which hearkens back to the waning years of 
the Soviet Union and the east European ³revolutions² of 1989, has disrupted 
Putin¹s plans to keep a leader in Ukraine who would be more pliant to Russia¹s 
wishes. Putin¹s personal efforts, unmistakable though they were, have thus far 
been largely ineffective. Ukraine is Russia¹s ³near West² and Europe¹s ³near 
East² and Putin claims that a Western-focused leader would undermine his own 
efforts to retain Russia¹s influence on its former Soviet neighbors. Should 
Yushchenko win, Putin could attempt to absorb Ukraine¹s pro-Russian east at 
the price of a clash with the West, jeopardizing his own power. 
 
Several Russian liberals, who have criticized Russia¹s role in the Ukrainian 
election crisis, support a new runoff election and do not wish to see Putin divide 
Ukraine any further. Yabloko Vice Chairman Sergei Mitrokhin stated that Russian 
liberals must demand that events in Ukraine remain non-violent and reflect a 
³strict² and ³authentic² expression of the will of the people. (3) He said, ³We must 
not support any manifestation of separatism in Ukraine –western or eastern—and 
must also demand from the Russian authorities that they reject impudent 
interference in the situation in Ukraine that will lead to such grievous 
consequences as a split in the country.² (4) Boris Nemtsov, a leader of the Union 
of Rightist Forces (SPS) who backed Yushchenko, stated, ³The choice of the 
Ukrainian people, whatever it is, must be respected even if the Kremlin doesn¹t 
share it.² (5) Nemtsov argued that should Russia involve itself in any sort of 
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separatist activities in eastern Ukraine, it could set an unwelcome precedent for 
Russia itself. (6) 
 
The United States supports a repeated runoff election. The U.S. Ambassador to 
Russia, Alexander Vershbow, stated that the U.S. does not regard Ukraine as an 
area of confrontation with Russia and that it is in the interest of all friends of 
Ukraine to settle the situation through political and legal means. (7) Javier 
Solana, Secretary-General of the Council of the E.U., also stated that he does 
not see any threat to E.U.-Russian relations regarding Ukraine. (8) If the election 
is held, the OSCE may double the number of poll monitors to 1,000. Bulgarian 
Foreign Minister Solomon Passy, chair of the OSCE, stated, ³In particular, we 
expect to see a fair campaign and unbiased reporting in state-controlled media.² 
(9) Russia¹s ambassador to the OSCE countered the agency¹s monitoring 
efforts: ³Sometimes they are not objective in their assessment of the electoral 
processŠthey should be helping not criticizing unfairly.² (10) 
 
The strains in Ukraine are testing the post-Cold War relationship between Russia 
and the West, and threatening to reopen wounds within the former Soviet Union 
as well. 
 
A new power center 
Recently, President Putin made official visits to both India and Turkey. Although 
Russia historically has had different relations with each country, these recent 
visits had the same goal: to create a new political power center in response to 
the influence of the United States. Putin¹s statements in New Delhi about the 
United States¹ ³dictatorship in global affairs, even if presented in pseudo-
democratic words² and how dangerous it is to attempt to ³overhaul the God-
created multifaceted and diverse civilization according to the barrack-like 
principles of a unipolar world² reflected this desire to counter the U.S. (11) 
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Russia¹s appeal to Turkey as a potential ally is certainly unprecedented and 
could be successful, especially given the dismal outlook for Turkey¹s accession 
to the E.U. and growing anti-American sentiments within the country. A Russian-
Indian declaration called for tripartite cooperation between Russia, India and 
China and a three-party summit will be held next year. (12) 
 
Source Notes: 
 
(1) New York Times, 6 Dec 04 via 
(www.nytimes.com/2004/12/06/international/europe/06ukraine.html). 
(2) Ibid. 
(3) The Eurasia Daily Monitor, 3 Dec 04, vol. 1, issue 139, ³Yavlinsky: Kremlin 
Must Stop Trying to Split Ukraine² by Charles Gurin. 
(4) Ibid. 
(5) Ibid. 
(6) Ibid. 
(7) Johnson¹s Russia List, 1 Dec 04, #12 –JRL 8478 via 
(http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/8478-8.cfm). 
(8) Johnson¹s Russia List, 1 Dec 04, #12 –JRL 8478 via 
(www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/8478-12.cfm). 
(9) BBC News, 6 Dec 04 via (news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-
/1/hi/world/Europe/4071095.stm). 
(10) Ibid. 
(11) RIA Novosti, 6 Dec 04 via 
(en.rian.index.cfm?prd_id=160&msg_id=5175553). 
(12) Ibid. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Domestic Issues and Legislative 
Branch 
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By Robyn Angley 
 
POLITICS AND SOCIETY 
Someone finally said it 
"And here is the main answer to the main question: Of course, the state is guilty, 
and apparently law enforcement agencies hadn't done everything possible [to 
ensure appropriate action] if this happened," said Alexander Torshin on 
November 5. (1)  Torshin is the head of the parliamentary commission into the 
Beslan hostage takings. The commission has continued its work, discovering that 
a senior criminal investigation officer with the Ingush interior ministry, Captain 
Bashir Pliyev, was one of the Beslan hostage-takers. (2) 
 
Torshin recently announced that the commission has indirect evidence that a 
foreign special service was involved in the attacks. (3)  He gave no indication as 
to whose service it was, but said that the commission was investigating all 
possibilities. 
 
Torshin also recommended barring the use of juries to try suspects involved in 
bandit groups or terrorist activities. A bill significantly altering the use of juries in 
courts has been submitted to the State Duma. "I am urging the deputies to 
consider this bill immediately. I recently spoke with a prosecutor from a North 
Caucasus republic, and he told me openly that any man who has been caught 
with weapons in his hands, or is suspected of being a member of an armed 
group, or aiding and abetting terrorists demands from the very start, that his case 
be considered by a jury. And it happens sometimes that the jury acquits the 
suspect," Torshin said. He also believes the inadequacy of the police and court 
systems has lead to the resurgence of blood feuds in the North Caucasus. (4) 
 
The media are playing a starring role in the commission's work, serving as a 
valued source of information. The commission has accepted approximately 20 
cassettes of the events from Russian and foreign media sources. Torshin said 
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that a section of the report is likely to state which information published in various 
media sources was verified and which information was not. (5) 
 
Appointment of regional leaders 
The Duma recently passed the bill eliminating the direct election of governors. 
The bill as altered from its original proposal, allowing the state legislature to 
reject candidates three times before the president can dissolve it, rather than the 
original two. 
 
Opposition to the law has come out of the ethnic republics of Tatarstan, 
Bashkortostan and Chuvashia, with Tatarstan's President Mintimer Shaymiyev 
characteristically leading the way. "We have a federation, Tatarstan is a republic, 
and it has a parliament elected by the people," said Rafael Khakimov, state 
counselor to Shaymiyev. "I concede that they may revise the constitution, but we 
may disagree with this constitution because this would be the constitution of a 
unitary state, and Tatarstan is upholding real federalism, and there have been 
perfectly real conquests on this path. What is left for us to do in this situation? To 
resist." (6) 
 
Proposed amendments springing from Tatarstan¹s State Council included a time 
limit on the law and forbidding the dissolution of the regional parliaments. (7) The 
amendments were not included in the Duma¹s recently passed version of the bill. 
 
The objections of Tatarstan and the other Volga republics stand in contrast to the 
sounds of approval coming from other regional leaders. The drive to join the pro-
Kremlin United Russia party immediately following the announcement of the 
reforms signals an interest in towing the line by most regional leaders. 
 
Perhaps an opposition? 
On December 12, a civic congress uniting non-governmental organizations, 
journalists, politicians, and medium and small-sized businesses will meet in 
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Moscow. The purpose of the conference is to "mobilize civil society," it is hoped 
toward the goal of observing elections, addressing corruption, and speaking up 
about the direction Russia's political system is taking, according to Georgi 
Satarov, president of the InDem Foundation and co-chair of the conference. (8) 
Perhaps the meeting of the various segments of society who are opposed to the 
changes happening in Russia will coalesce in a united opposition. 
 
Changes with Ukraine 
Sergei Mironov, head of the Federation Council, announced on November 10 the 
ratification of a protocol changing the requirements for Russians visiting Ukraine 
and Ukrainians visiting Russia. The protocol allows Ukrainians to visit Russia for 
up to 90 days without being required to register. (9) Given the events of the last 
few weeks in Ukraine, one cannot help but wonder if small changes such as 
these were meant to inch the pro-Russian side of Ukraine a bit closer to its 
powerful neighbor. 
 
Source Notes: 
 
(1) Federal News Service, 5 Nov 04 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(2) ³A finding for the guerillas,² Gazeta, 5 Nov 04 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(3) ³Foreign special service involved in Beslan hostage-taking, part 1,² Interfax, 
27 Nov 04 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(4) ³Foreign special service involved in Beslan hostage-taking, part 2,² Interfax, 
27 Nov 04via Lexis-Nexis. 
(5) Federal News Service, 5 Nov 04 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(6) Tatarstan Opposed to Putin's Proposal for Dissolution of Regional 
Parliaments, Nezavisimaya gazeta, 11 Nov 04; FBIS-SOV-2004-1111 via World 
News Connection. 
(7) Ibid. 
(8) Government is as bad as society allows it to be, Novaya gazeta, 2 Dec 04 via 
Johnson's Russia List #8481. 
 18 
(9) Meeting with Head of the Federation Council Sergei Mironov, 10 Nov 04 via 
(http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2004/11/10/1945_79294.shtml). 
 
 
Russian Federation: Armed Forces 
By Jeff Kubiak and Kyle Colton 
 
INTERNAL 
Making something out of nothing 
President Putin¹s speech at the annual conference of Russia¹s top military 
leaders was at least partially successful.  Although he spoke for only 6 minutes, 
he generated a stir in the international media with his assertion that ³Russia will 
soon have unique nuclear systems that have no counterparts in other nuclear 
powers.² (1)  Having nothing more encouraging to tell the nation¹s highest 
ranking military personnel, President Putin focused on the one solid piece of 
evidence proving Russia¹s claim to great power status – its nuclear arsenal.  
While underscoring that Russia still views terrorism as the greatest threat to its 
national security, ³we understand that the moment we turn our attention from 
such elements of our defenses as a nuclear missile shield, then we will be facing 
new threats.² (2)  Putin¹s pep talk was aimed primarily at the large number in the 
crowd who, stuck in the Soviet era mindset, have tried to convince themselves 
that the West, and in particular the U.S. missile defense system, presents a 
threat to Russia¹s national security.  This new nuclear missile capability, Putin¹s 
argument goes, will secure its great power status.  According to Pavel 
Felgenhauer, the Moscow-based military analyst, ³Putin is now using the Soviet-
designed ABM penetration gadgets as a propaganda ploy – to keep his 
disgruntled military happy and remind the Russian public that our nation is still 
great and can deploy nukes that no one else has.² (3) 
 
The most successful aspect of Putin¹s speech was that it created a media stir, by 
creating something out of nothing.  In being vague and elusive, Putin kept his 
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wider audience guessing as to exactly what technology he was talking about.  
Speculation in the media following the speech was varied, but the general 
consensus is that the President was referring to a new maneuverable warhead 
for Russia¹s operational Topol-M land-based ICBMs, or perhaps to the recently 
tested Bulava SLBM. (4)  In either case, Putin presented no new information to 
anyone in the West.  The requirements of the so-called ³Moscow treaty² signed 
by Russia and the U.S. in 2002 requires both sides to notify each other in due 
time about research on nuclear missiles. (5)  Typical of the reaction from the U.S. 
to Putin¹s pronouncement, White House spokesman Scott McClellan said: ³We 
are very well aware of their (Russia¹s) long-standing modernization efforts for 
their military.² (6) 
 
³Satisfactory² in 2004 
Besides the proclamations regarding the new nuclear weapons, Putin told his 
generals that the work of the Defense Ministry in 2004 was satisfactory and that 
the state would continue to support the army and the navy.  But he also laid 
down a reform agenda for his military leaders, telling them that significant 
improvements needed to be made on several fronts simultaneously: 1) the size, 
structure and composition of the force must be commensurate with the threat; 2) 
combat readiness needs to be increased, especially in the permanent readiness 
forces; 3) the state is spending increased amounts of resources to reequip the 
army.  On this point, Putin added emphasis on the need to spend the resources 
³sensibly.² (7)  His words hinted at his frustration with the ineffectiveness of 
countless efforts to reform the Russian military. 
 
Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov spoke for about an hour after President Putin¹s 
opening.  Ivanov briefly highlighted the ³success² achieved by the Defense 
Ministry over the past 12 months, but spent a significant amount of time on a 
more detailed assessment of the many problems that still face the military.  He 
admitted that Russian Armed Forces are not combat ready (except for the 
strategic nuclear forces) and that ³general purpose forces can only be deployed 
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after modification.² (8)  The readiness problems, according to Ivanov, stem from 
poor quality of the force, low pay, and obsolete hardware. (9)  Ivanov appears to 
be very concerned with money matters.  The system of acquisition within the 
Defense Ministry remains elusive.  Money goes into the acquisition process and 
very little hardware or capability comes out.  What does emerge typically 
represents a considerable amount of waste, redundancy, and lack of relevance 
to the Army¹s needs. (10)  The inability of Russia¹s leadership effectively to direct 
military reform caused one editorial writer to claim that ³policy does not dictate 
changes in the army, rather processes in the army itself dictate declared policy.  
More than R420bnŠhas been farmed out to the military for them to spend, while 
authorities merely adjust themselves to the result and increase the military 
budget.² (11) 
 
Reform of the Defense Ministry 
Ivanov was made Defense Minister in 2001 to reform the Russian military – to 
professionalize, reorganize and reequip it to make it once again the backbone of 
Russia¹s great power claim.  Despite a considerable amount of rhetoric, very little 
effective reform has taken place.  During the first three years of his tenure, 
Ivanov may have been unable to control events within the Ministry. Recently, 
however, Ivanov has garnered significantly more authority and freedom of action 
by using legislation, presidential decrees and bureaucratic infighting to eliminate 
political opponents from within the armed forces, emasculate the services and 
the General Staff, and stack the Defense Ministry staff with his former protégés 
from the FSB.  With the recent round of personnel moves announced in the 
middle of last month, this process is nearly complete.  The result is a Defense 
Ministry structure that, according to an article in Kommersant, makes Ivanov the 
most powerful of all Russia¹s siloviki. (12)  Gone are the political challenges from 
powerful generals in the general staff and services (namely, General Kvashnin, 
former chief of the General Staff, and General Kormiltsev, former Commander of 
the Ground Forces).   Their replacements have been mainly more junior officers 
who have significantly less political clout and who have demonstrated fewer 
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political aspirations.   Additionally, Ivanov has brought to the Defense Ministry a 
significant number of former colleagues from the FSB, the most noteworthy of 
whom are: Lt General Andrei Chobotov who was recently appointed Chief of the 
newly-formed Defense Ministry Staff; General Nikolai Pankov, who followed 
Ivanov to the Defense Ministry in 2001, lost his deputy minister titles but not the 
status, when he was put in charge of Personnel and Education (significantly 
labeled ³ideology² in other sources); and Colonel Sergei Rybakov who has been 
placed in charge of a newly developed, centralized information and public 
relations department and is a deputy to Chobotov. (13)  Chobotov is now 
considered to occupy the number two position within the Defense Ministry and 
strikes fear into the hearts of even commanders-in-chief. (14)  With an iron FSB 
grip on the Defense Ministry¹s information and personnel systems, Ivanov can 
command obedience from all ranks within the armed forces thanks to the power 
he now wields over defense personnel.  Insubordination or disloyalty can be 
punished by ³reorganization,² refusal to be ³certified² by the personnel system for 
a position, or even dismissal from the army. (15) 
 
To what end this new found power? 
With the centralization of power within the Defense Ministry, Ivanov may now be 
expected to produce real reform.  The obstacles presented by powerful generals 
within the armed forces seem to have been neutralized and the Defense Minister 
has gained considerable control over pertinent functions like finance, 
acquisitions, and personnel.  Ivanov¹s efforts to reform the military to meet the 
security needs of a 21st century Russia have, to this point, been foiled by a 
military that, according to Pavel Felgenhauer, ³was designed for waging war 
against the West.Šour military forces can do nothing else and do not want to 
learn something new.² (16)  Ivanov will apparently be successful in fulfilling his 
promise that no conscripts will serve in Defense Ministry forces in Chechnya after 
1 Jan 05.  He has established his two ³mountain² brigades and continues to work 
to professionalize and equip other permanent readiness forces.  But the one 
thing he hasn¹t done, although it appears he could have, was to help improve 
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conditions for the soldiers by raising their pay.  Ivanov blames the poor readiness 
levels of the armed forces and low morale on poor pay and living conditions.  He 
knows that 34% of the servicemen live below the poverty level.  Yet he supported 
the government¹s decision to cancel several benefits and, while his generals and 
central staff will see pay raises, Ivanov has failed to secure any increase for the 
soldier in the field. (17)  In fact, the president has raised the pay for all federal 
ministries and security structures except servicemen. (18)  Understanding that 
there is not nearly enough money in the defense budget to fix everything, this 
seems to be one area that would serve Ivanov and Putin by more than 
incrementally improving readiness.  It could reduce their exposure to political 
attack.  Already the civilian workers within the Defense Ministry have begun 
organized protests over their poor pay and those in uniform are supporting them. 
(19)  It could be just a matter of time before someone with power aspirations tries 
to convert the disgruntled masses in the Russian Armed Forces into a significant 
challenge to the power ³vertical² being built within the Defense Ministry.  History, 
however, would not be on their side. 
 
Source Notes: 
 
(1) ³Modernization of Russian Army Does Not Threaten the West,² Ria Novosti, 
18 Nov 04 via CDI Russia Weekly 19 Nov 04. 
(2) ³Russia to Acquire New Nuclear Weapons Systems: Putin,² AFP, 17 Nov 04 
via Johnson¹s Russia List (JRL). 
(3) ³Tilting at ABM Windmills,² by Pavel Felgenhauer, Moscow Times, 23 Nov 04 
via JRL. 
(4) ³Modernization of Russian Army Does Not Threaten the West,² Ria Novosti, 
18 Nov 04, via CDI Russia Weekly 19 Nov 04. 
(5) Ibid. 
(6) ³Russia Ups the Nuclear Ante,² by Sergei Blagov, Asia Times, 24 Nov 04 via 
JRL. 
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(7) ³Putin Outlines Tasks in Army Reforms,² Radio Mayak, Moscow, 17 Nov 04; 
BBC Monitoring via JRL. 
(8) ³Russia Without an Army,² by Alexei Nikolskii, Vedomosti, 18 Nov 04 via CDI 
Russia Weekly 19 Nov 04. 
(9) Ibid. 
(10) Ibid. 
(11) Vedomosti, 18 Nov 04; BBC Monitoring via ISI Emerging Markets. 
(12) ³Defense Ministry Restructuring Completed,² Kommersant, 16 Nov 04; WPS 
– Defense and Security via ISI Emerging Markets. 
(13) ³FSB Officers Are Taking Key Positions within the Defense Ministry,² Russky 
kurier, 28 Oct 04; WPS – Defense and Security via Lexis-Nexis 
(14) ³Military System of Information Is Moving In a Closed Circle,² Nezavisimoye 
voyennoye obozreniye, No. 44, 19-15 Nov 04; WPS – Defense and Security via 
ISI Emerging Markets. 
(15) Ibid and ³Reforms Cause Conflict Within the Defense Ministry,² 
Nezavisimoye voyennoye obozreniye, No. 42, 5 Nov 04; WPS – Russian Political 
Monitor via ISI Emerging Markets. 
(16) ³Russia Is Losing Its Battle Against Shadows,² by Pavel Felgenhauer, 
Novaya gazeta, No. 85, 18 Nov 04 via ISI Emerging Markets. 
(17) ³The Army and Navy as the Main Outcasts in Russia,² WPS – Defense and 
Security, 29 Nov 04 via ISI Emerging Markets. 
(18) ³Russia Without an Army,² by Alexei Nikolskii, Vedomosti, 18 Nov 04 via CDI 
Russia Weekly 19 Nov 04. 
(19) ³The Army and Navy as The Main Outcasts in Russia,² WPS – Defense and 
Security, 29 Nov 04 via ISI Emerging Markets. 
 
EXTERNAL 
The military future of the CIS and CSTO 
The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) Defense Ministers Council 
meetings, at the Staff for Coordinating Military Cooperation (ShKVS) in Moscow 
on November 25, indicated the Kremlin¹s strong desire to strengthen further both 
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the CIS and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) security 
mechanisms.  These desires echoed the counterterrorism focused discussions of 
the 16 September CIS Astana summit.  It appears that in the post-Beslan 
environment, Russia wants to demonstrate that military cooperation in former 
Soviet republics is increasing not only with its CSTO allies, but also throughout 
the CIS.  
 
Since the breakup of the Soviet Union, politicians have accomplished little with 
regard to unifying the CIS into a useful economic or social bloc.  Leaders have 
struggled to define CIS interests, or even to identify common national interests.  
Additionally, no effective treaty implementation or monitoring mechanisms have 
been established.  Even during the 16 September summit, CIS leaders, with 
counterterrorism clearly a common interest, failed to forge any useful 
agreements.  
 
Uzbek President Islam Karimov expressed a widely shared frustration with the 
CIS before the Astana summit. Speaking to Uzbek TV on 15 September, 
Karimov said, "CIS summits are held regularly, as if they are actually doing 
something.  But do they have any impact?  I think this is a natural question.  We 
pinned great hopes on the CIS.  Unfortunately, its activity over the past 13 years 
has not met our expectations." (1) Moldovan Prime Minister Vasile Tarlev, who 
did not attend the Astana summit because of ongoing conflict in the Transdniestr 
region, concurred with President Karimov.  He stated, ³It is an obvious fact that 
our Commonwealth has not become an efficacious mechanism for mutually 
beneficial partnership and rapprochement among our nations.² (2) Kazakhstan's 
President Nursultan Nazarbayev, host of the Astana Summit, took the next step 
by proposing radical reform of the CIS in the hope of promoting real progress in 
countering terrorism.  He suggested abolishing a wide range of political 
structures, which were originally designed to maintain cooperation in post-Soviet 
republics.  He proposed liquidating the CIS Defense Ministers Council and the 
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Staff for Coordinating Military Cooperation.  Additionally, he called on CIS 
leaders to act instead of just producing endless paper agreements. 
 
Most post-Soviet countries will not support Kazakhstan's initiative.  Military 
cooperation and integration has been the one marginally successful undertaking 
of the CIS.  The majority of CIS countries do not want to abolish these structures, 
but they do want to increase collective military cooperation to ensure security.  
As new common concerns, specifically international terrorism, become more 
dangerous and frustration with the CIS lingers, it is viewed as increasingly 
important that the Russian military continues to unify security efforts before CIS 
and CSTO member states look elsewhere for solutions.  With this in mind, 
Russia has tried to create new incentives for military integration. 
 
New incentives and Central Asia 
The Duma recently ratified a protocol allowing major increases in the military and 
technical cooperation among CSTO member states.  "The protocol's ratification 
creates grounds for increasing supplies of military products to the CSTO member 
states," stressed Russian First Foreign Deputy Minister Valeri Loshchinin. (3) 
This document encourages admission of new countries to the CSTO and furthers 
military integration.  It also creates the legal basis for increasing supplies of 
military hardware transferred to CSTO countries at preferential financial rates. 
 
In addition to more equipment at better prices, Nikolai Bordyuzha, CSTO 
Secretary-General, confirmed that CSTO member states have examined a 
concept of forming a much larger combined force than currently exists in the 
Central Asian region. (4) The suggested military unit would include a joint group 
of troops including units from all the CSTO states¹ Armed Forces and would 
number almost 10,000.  This group, once formed, would be almost four times the 
size of the current Collective Rapid Deployment Forces (CRDF), which currently 
operate in Central Asia.  Just like all CSTO military groups, the majority of the 
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forces that comprise this group will be from the Russian combined-arms military 
base in Tajikistan and the Russian air force base in Kyrgyzstan. 
 
Russia's attempts to increase its security influence within Central Asia are not 
just to counterbalance the continuing presence of U.S. and Western military 
forces in the region in support of Operation Enduring Freedom.  Central Asia 
constitutes Russia¹s best chance to establish a useful cooperative security 
environment. Other regions of the CIS are full of frozen conflicts and NATO 
aspirations.  Relations between Russia and Georgia have been tense for the last 
decade and Georgia is pursuing a NATO membership action plan. (5) Moldova's 
relationship with Russia has also turned cold due to Moscow's ongoing support 
for the separatist Transdniestr region.  Armenia and Azerbaijan have been at war 
for more than 10 years and both countries have participated in numerous NATO 
Partnership for Peace exercises.  Ukraine, despite its current political turmoil, 
signed its NATO working plan for 2005 in November. (6) Regardless of political 
instability, Ukraine still seems to be working toward NATO membership. 
 
The ongoing political situation in Ukraine may further strengthen Russia¹s 
influence in Central Asia.  Central Asian leaders have shown little capacity or 
desire to improve human rights or make progress toward democratizing their 
countries. These ³NATO² values are usually a requirement for increasing military 
cooperation with the West. Regardless of the election¹s outcome in Ukraine, 
some Central Asian leaders may view supporting ³NATO² values as too risky.  By 
developing security ties with Moscow, Central Asian leaders are able to avoid 
such risks. Central Asian states appear more comfortable in dealing with Russia, 
perhaps because Russia does not require political accountability from host 
governments in return for military or security assistance. This turn away from pro-
Western policies may assist Moscow's efforts to slow the westward drift of the 
former Soviet republics, at least in this region. 
 
CSTO/CIS military readiness and exercises 
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Aside from the political maneuvering and differing national interests, the CIS and 
CSTO have a more relevant military problem.  There is a distinct lack of complex, 
integrated joint training within the CIS/CSTO.  Russia, as architect for the 
majority of training programs, appears preoccupied with putting on a good show 
instead of useful training.  Joint CIS/CSTO training is usually a highly 
orchestrated, centrally controlled event to ensure ³success² and avoid national 
embarrassment. 
 
Colonel General Alexander Skorodumov, head of the Russian Armed Forces 
Combat Training Directorate, said "The results of the combat training year in the 
Land Forces and the Navy prove that, unfortunately, troops combat training does 
not meet requirements of the modern battlefield, and that in fact troops are not 
ready to face existing and future threats."(7)  While this comment was about 
Russian troops specifically, it applies to the CIS military as well, since Russia is 
the CSTO/CIS main security provider and military trainer.  General Skorodumov 
additionally claims that troop training is affected by excessive centralization of all 
exercises, as well as by the repeated conduct of demonstration exercises.  
These types of exercises are often conducted at the expense of practical training. 
(8) 
 
Tajikistan will host a command post exercise of the Collective Security Treaty 
Organization (CSTO) in April 2005. (9)  "The main goal of the Rubezh 2005 joint 
command post exercise (CPX) is to rehearse coordinated activity of the CSTO 
Unified HQ, staff bodies of the Collective Rapid Deployment Forces, and other 
staff bodies while preparing joint stabilization efforts in Central Asia," Lieutenant 
General Vasili Zavgorodni, first deputy chief of the CSTO Unified HQ, said. (10)  
The exercise will involve operations teams of general staffs from all CSTO 
member nations and units of the Collective Rapid Deployment Forces stationed 
in Central Asia.  The effectiveness of this exercise will be limited, like most CSTO 
exercises, by high levels of simulation and centralized control. 
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Conclusion 
In the aftermath of Beslan, the Russian military is working hard to coordinate 
more effectively counterterrorism responses in Russia and the CIS as a whole.  
Russian President Vladimir Putin is driving this priority, desperate to show real 
progress in the Russian and CIS security environment.  Additionally, the 
uncertain political situation in Ukraine has raised fears in some former Soviet 
Republics about pursuing close relations with the West.  Because several former 
Soviet states do not share ³NATO² values, Moscow may appear a more palatable 
security option.  Increased Russian incentives and fear of a backlash from 
democratic reforms likely will ensure future military cooperation between Russia 
and the former Soviet republics at least in Central Asia.  
 
The CIS/CSTO militaries, under Russia's direction, will continue to face an 
increasing threat from international terrorism, unless the alliance implements 
exact standards for training and readiness.  The Russian military, despite its 
advanced technology, continues to lag behind the Western powers, because it 
does not make the appropriate investment in training.  While it appears that 
Russia has had its first success in attempting to increase security integration, it 
has imparted its training problems to the CIS/CSTO militaries. 
 
Source Notes: 
 
 (1) (www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2004/09/9a889321-6b57-4134-9b8c-
5b2181ae98ca.html). 
(2) ³The Same Old Song in Astana,² by Vladimir Kravchenko; Zerkalo nedeli via 
(www.mirror-weekly.com/nn/show/521/47827). 
(3) Moscow Nezavisimaya gazeta, 29 Nov 04; FBIS-SOV-2004-1129 via World 
News Connection. 
(4) Ibid. 
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Newly Independent States: Western Region 
By Elena Selyuk 
 
UKRAINE 
The Supreme Court orders run-off of the second tour 
Last Friday, the Ukrainian Supreme Court announced its decision to conduct a 
repeat run-off of the presidential elections.  The decision of the Supreme Court is 
final and is not subject to appeal. The reactions of each political camp were, of 
course, dramatically different. Yanukovich¹s supporters left the court room in 
anticipation of the announced decision. Yushchenko¹s lawyers and thousands of 
his supporters at Independence Square, on the other hand, exploded in joy 
making yet another circuit on the emotional rollercoaster of this political crisis.  
 
The Supreme Court set a precedent by allowing a repeat vote, as such a 
decision goes beyond the legal framework determined by the Constitution. (The 
Constitution allows a recount of votes, a run off in several regions, holding new 
elections, but not a complete re-run.)  Overwhelming evidence of fraud was the 
reason cited by the Supreme Court for holding a repeat vote. The Supreme Court 
did not directly accuse either candidate of organizing fraud, but rather spoke 
 30 
against the falsifications per se and against the unlawful actions of the elections¹ 
organizers, i.e. the Central Election Commission (CEC). While it is obvious that 
an overwhelming number of violations was orchestrated by the CEC on behalf of 
the government, it seems difficult to believe that Yushchenko¹s supporters in 
Western parts of Ukraine acted above reproach. The CEC, therefore, is accused 
of both devising the electoral fraud and of not being able to prevent it. 
Yushchenko¹s supporters were quick to point to the possibility of bringing 
criminal charges against the CEC members. Appointing new member of the CEC 
is one of the opposition¹s demands. 
 
The decision of the Supreme Court is an indication of its relative independence 
from Kuchma¹s centralized power. The parliament elects judges for life, which is 
at least a step towards basic Supreme Court independence. (1)  That is not to 
say however, that there were no attempts to manipulate and intimidate some of 
the 85 Supreme Court judges during this political crisis. Enormous pressure has 
been asserted on almost every one of them – they were either offered money or 
threatened. (2) 
 
The run-off is set to take place by 26 December 2004. As of now, both 
candidates are planning to take part in the elections. Many opposition candidates 
are calling for Yanukovich resignation. One of the opposition leaders said that ³if 
Yanukovich decides to participate in the run-off, his defeat will be tremendous. 
His political future will be doomed.² (3) Leonid Kuchma also seems to think that 
Yanukovich should give up his presidential ambitions: "Though Yanukovich said 
he would run, Šif I were he, I would not, from any point of view. I do not exclude 
that we shall have a plebiscite instead of elections, with one candidate. I do not 
want to say it is final but this is how the situation is developing." (4) If 
Yanukovich, in the end, should reconsider his current decision to participate in 
the run off and announce his decision at least ten days before the elections, then 
according to Ukrainian law, the candidate who came in third in the first round, in 
this case Alexander Moroz, would become Yushchenko¹s contender. If 
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Yanukovich should announces his decision not to participate in the elections less 
than ten days before the date set, Yushchenko would remain the only candidate 
and would have to obtain fifty percent plus one vote in order to win. (5) In any 
case, should this scenario unfold, Yushchenko is guaranteed a victory, since 
Moroz is one of his political supporters. Yanukovich, however, seems unlikely to 
give way to pressure: "I have a choice: to withdraw or continue the struggle.  I am 
also under pressure, but my decision is a straightforward one. I continue the 
struggle because there are millions of people of Ukraine behind me." (6) 
 
Therefore, it appears that both candidates are still in the game and have already 
started the ³second round² of pre-election campaigning. Most believe that 
elections conducted in a transparent and honest way would mean a definite 
victory for Yushchenko. Such conditions, of course, are not guaranteed. Even 
though he is rapidly losing power and no longer controls the Verkhovna Rada, 
Kuchma is still in charge of the country and of the army. By refusing to dissolve 
Yanukovich¹s government, Kuchma is attempting to demonstrate that he is still in 
the game. (7) 
 
This Wednesday, however, Verkhovna Rada unexpectedly adopted electoral and 
constitutional changes – a compromise decision aimed at stabilizing political 
situation in the country. The compromise consisted of voting for electoral 
(favored by Yushchenko) and constitutional (favored by Kuchma) changes 
together.  This package will limit the powers of the president and will give more 
power to the parliament starting 1 September, 2005. Changes in the ³Elections 
Law² are intended to limit potential falsifications during the December vote and 
make elections more transparent. Even though Yushchenko was opposed to the 
constitutional changes justifying his resistance by alleged government¹s desire to 
limit his powers once he becomes the president, this decision is argued to be a 
positive one for the country, as it immunes Ukraine from emergence of future 
authoritarian governments – a helpful aspect given Yushchenko¹s health 
condition and uncertainly about Yushchenko¹s successor. Nevertheless, one 
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might wonder about the reasons behind Yushchenko¹s support for this 
³compromise,²  as the political reform bill could have been passed a year ago 
without going through the ordeal of current political and economic crisis and 
without exhausting hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians, who spent days at the 
Independence square, supporting the opposition. Is this what they were fighting 
for? 
 
The People 
The Supreme Court¹s Friday announcement constituted a definite victory for the 
Ukrainian people, who showed incredible endurance, stamina and dedication in 
order to obtain freedom from intimidation, manipulation and lies, which have 
bedevilled Ukrainian society for the past decade. Their willingness to 
demonstrate peacefully at Independence Square and across Ukraine, despite the 
freezing cold and in spite of Yushchenko¹s indecisive leadership, until they 
receive what they rightfully deserve, is truly amazing. Ukrainians proved to the 
world and to many political analysts, who predicted that the weather and 
Yushchenko¹s leadership style would gradually dissolve the crowds, that they 
would not leave Independence Square until their rights were acknowledged by 
their highest political institutions. 
 
A former team member from the Institute for the Study of Conflict, Ideology and 
Policy, Ms. Tammy Lynch, who is in Ukraine now, shared with us her experience 
of being in Kiev during these remarkable days.  A colleague of Ms. Lynch, an 
ENEMO administrative assistant, said to her: ³It doesn¹t matter what Yushchenko 
does or does not do.  It doesn¹t matter what Tymoshenko says.  My friends will 
stay until we achieve the truth.² Tammy¹s landlord said to her, ³I am for 
Yushchenko.  I am for freedom.  We will keep demonstrating until we get 
freedom.² And finally, a dapper older gentleman on the street offered with a slight 
bow to help Tammy carry her bags one morning.  He had a Yushchenko flag in 
his pocket and had a bright orange ribbon tied to his coat.  He said he was on his 
way to the square, ³because now is not the time to work.²  She asked, ³How long 
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will you stay on the square?²  ³Until we have victory,² he replied.  ³Until we find 
the truth.  Until Victor Yushchenko is our president.² 
 
Young and old came together in this political crisis. It was touching to see elderly 
men and women bringing soup and blankets to the students, as well as sharing 
food and warm clothes even with Yanukovich supporters, who primarily came 
from the East of the country. The maturity of these peaceful demonstrators 
cannot help but evoke the respect and admiration of the whole world and give a 
sparkle of hope to other post-Soviet nations, many of which still find themselves 
under the iron first of authoritarian leaders. 
 
Chronology of events: 
 
31 October 2004 –First round of the presidential elections. According to official 
results, in the first round, Yushchenko gains 39.87 percent of the vote, 
Yanukovich – 39.32 percent. 
21 November  - Second round of the presidential elections. 
22 November –According to the official numbers of the Central Election 
Commission (CEC), in the second round of the elections, Yanukovich wins 49.42 
percent and Yushchenko 46.69 percent of the vote. 
23 November – More than 100,000 Yushchenko supporters gather in Kiev, 
demonstrations start in other Ukrainian cities, as well. Yushchenko takes a 
symbolic oath as President in the Verkhovna Rada. 
24 November – More protestors pour into Kiev from all corners of Ukraine, 
barricading the Cabinet of Ministers and paralyzing the work of the government. 
25 November – Official suspension of elections results by the Ukrainian 
Supreme Court. 
26 November – Leonid Kuchma organizes round table talks between 
Yushchenko and Yanukovich with high-level foreign mediators present: Javier 
Solana, Jan Kubis, and Aleksander Kwasniewski, among others. 
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27 November – The Verkhovna Rada declares the poll results invalid and 
passes a vote of no confidence in Central Election¹s Commission. 
28 November – A demand for autonomy of the Russian-speaking parts of 
Ukraine is raised at the meeting of pro-government supporters in Severodonetsk. 
29, 30 November – Negotiations between the government and the opposition 
end without agreement. Leonid Kuchma announces that he would support 
holding an entirely new presidential election, not just a rerun of the disputed 
second round. 
1 December - The Ukrainian parliament passes a motion of no confidence in the 
Yanukovich government with 229 votes in favor and votes to create a 
"government of national trust." 
2 December – President Kuchma and Russian President Vladimir Putin meet in 
Moscow to discuss the ongoing crisis. The two presidents issue a statement 
calling for an entirely new election. 
3 December – The Ukrainian Supreme Court orderes a repeat vote of the 
second round of the election throughout Ukraine no later than 26 December, 
2004. 
4 December – Protests in Kiev calm down. The Ukrainian parliament failes to 
adopt election law changes that were requested by Yushchenko¹s supporters. 
5 December - In an interview with BBC television, Yushchenko asks that the 
international community does not interfere in the new election. 
6 December - Yushchenko continues to campaign for amendments to the 
election laws that would ban voting by absentee ballots and in people's homes, 
both of which were seen as being among the most abused election provisions in 
the first two ballots. (8) Were seen as being among the most abused election 
provisions in the first two votes. (8) 
8 December - Verkhovna Rada adopts electoral (aimed at assuring transparent 
and fair elections) and constitutional changes (which will limit the powers of the 
president and extend the authority of the parliament) – a compromise decision 
aimed at stabilizing political situation in the country. 
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BELARUS 
Ural Latypov¹s dismissal 
Last week, Aleksandr Lukashenko made several staff changes. They started with 
the dismissal of Lukashenko¹s Chief of Staff, Ural Latypov, with a decree 
announcing the former KGB officer¹s retirement. Viktor Sheiman was appointed 
as the new chief of staff.  The choice of Latypov¹s successor is rather curious, 
since Sheiman is the President¹s most trusted associate, who (along with other 
members of the government) was accused of being behind the disappearances 
of several opponents of Lukashenko¹s regime. This September, the E.U. and the 
U.S. prohibited Sheiman (along with other Belarusian high standing government 
officials) from entering E.U. countries and the United States. (9) 
 
For many, the dismissal of Latypov did not come as a surprise. According to the 
leader of the Belarusian Communist Party, Sergei Kalyakin, such a dismissal ³fits 
into an already common Lukashenko¹s practice to let go of people who worked 
on assuring his next elegant victory.² (10)  Following this logic, this dismissal is 
not the last one in the government. 
 
Several possible reasons for Latypov¹s dismissal were named by the observers. 
The first one is Lukashenko¹s cleansing of his administration in preparation for 
the upcoming presidential elections. (11) The second plausible explanation 
concerns Latypov¹s close relations with the Kremlin, which Lukashenko does not 
favor. Some other likely motives might have to do with Latypov taking another 
post (KGB Chief) or simply retiring from service in the government. Having 
secure connections in the administration, as well as its protection, Latypov has 
an open door into big business. (12) 
 
Latypov has headed Lukashenko¹s presidential administration since 2001. 
Earlier, he worked as Foreign Minister and as the Secretary of the Belarusian 
Security Council. A week before his dismissal, Lukashenko awarded Latypov the 
Order of Friendship of the Peoples in recognition of his fruitful work in the bodies 
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of the state administration (13) – presumably, a sign of mutual understanding and 
agreement on Latypov¹s dismissal. 
 
MOLDOVA 
Moldovan Foreign Minister Andrei Stratan has declared that Moldova wishes to 
change the five-party format of Dniestr settlement negotiations because Russia, 
Ukraine and the OSCE were not able to define a common position on the final 
desired outcome of the negotiations and because, with Transdniestr and 
(Kuchma¹s) Ukraine, Russia was controlling the format. (14) The settlement 
negotiations were stopped after Dniestr authorities closed several schools that 
use the Latin script. 
 
Meanwhile, Moscow declared that it was interested in a fast pullout of Russian 
weapons from the Dniestr region. ³There are no Russian troops in Dniestr, and 
there are only depots and about 1,500 people who are guarding them,² said 
Sergei Yastrzhembsky to Ekho Moskvy radio station. (15) 
 
Source Notes: 
 
(1) The New York Times, 4 Dec 04. Page A8. 
(2) Gazeta.ru, ³We're Talking About a Criminal Gang² by Ilya Zhegulev, 1 Dec 04 
via (www.gazeta.ru). 
(3) Ekho Moskvy, 05 Dec 04 via (http://www.echo.msk.ru/news/219941.html). 
(4) New York Times, 6 Dec 04 via UKL, The Ukraine List (UKL) #301, 5 Dec 04. 
(5)  Ekho Moskvy, 3 Dec 04 via (http://www.echo.msk.ru/news/2004/12/03.html). 
(6) New York Times, ³No Deal Yet in Ukraine After Talks on Political Changes,² 7 
Dec 04 via UKL #303, 6 Dec 04. 
(7) Ukrainskaya pravda website, 5 Dec 04 via (http://www2.pravda.com.ua/ru/). 
(8) Wikipedia, the Free Encyclopedia via (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Post-
election_developments_in_Ukraine%2C_2004). 
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(9) Charter97 website, 29 Nov 04 via 
(http://www.charter97.org/rus/news/2004/11/29/shejman). 
(10) Charter 97 website, 29 Nov 04 via 
(http://www.charter97.org/rus/news/2004/11/29/otstavka). 
(11) Kommersant, 30 Nov 04 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(12) Charter 97 website, 29 Nov 04 via 
(http://www.charter97.org/rus/news/2004/11/29/otstavka). 
(13) BELTA – News Line, Nov 23 04 via ISI Emerging Markets Database. 
(14) CHISINAU, 30 Nov 04 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(15) ITAR-TASS news agency, 24 Nov 04; BBC Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Caucasus 
By Ariela Shapiro 
 
ARMENIA 
Risking a potentially irreversible split in the governing coalition, the three parties 
comprising Armenian President Robert Kocharian¹s government have failed to 
reach an agreement on electoral reforms.  Prime Minister Andranik Markarian¹s 
Republican Party (HHK) and its junior coalition partners, the Armenian 
Revolutionary Federation- Dashnaktsutiun and the Orinats Yerkir (Country of 
Law) Party, remain divided over the composition of the parliament and 
specifically how MPs are elected. (1)  
 
In the existing system, 75 of the 131 members of the national assembly are 
elected under a proportional system, with voters choosing a list of candidates 
fielded by a party or a bloc.  The remaining 56 seats are distributed in single 
mandate constituencies under the plurality system, which is prevalent in the U.S. 
and Britain. (2)  The vast majority of Armenian lawmakers elected under the 
plurality system are affluent, well-connected government officials.  In most 
instances, these MPs wield great financial influence within their respective 
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constituencies and secure electoral victory through thinly veiled bribery and 
political manipulation.  Many are affiliated to and supported by the Republican 
Party, a key reason why Markarian¹s Party constitutes the largest parliamentary 
faction and continually opposes any change in the current electoral system. (3)  
The Armenian Revolutionary Federation, or ARF, and the Orinats Yerkir Party 
fare poorly in the single-mandate constituencies and want more parliament seats 
to be contested under the proportional system, with a subsequent reduction in 
the number of plurality seats in the legislature.  The ARF maintains that the 
expansion of the proportional system is a key part of the coalition¹s power-
sharing accord, and threatens to break with the coalition unless the HHK 
modifies its position to endorse electoral reform. (4) The Republican Party has 
not heeded the ARF¹s warnings, as indicated by senior Republican deputy Gagik 
Melikian¹s statement on 23 November that the HHK will retain the current seat 
proportions for the next elections. (5)   
 
The coalition leaders are expected to meet again in another attempt to break the 
political impasse. (6) Their failure to reach common ground could require 
Kocharian¹s intervention in this electoral dispute, which has severely disrupted 
the governing coalition¹s hold on power.  
 
In a bid to prevail in the standoff and gain further clout, the rival parties are 
engineering new political realignments, both within the government and the 
parliament.  The Republicans are courting the People¹s Deputy Group of non-
partisan lawyers, while the Orinats Yerkir Party has enlisted the support of the 
united Labor Party, a small pro-Kocharian group represented in the current 
legislature. (7)  
 
The existing balance of forces in the parliament favors the HHK, together with the 
People¹s Deputy Group; they hold about 60 parliament seats compared to less 
than 40 seats controlled by their opponents within the coalition. (8) However, the 
junior coalition members could win the current electoral reform debate if they 
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gained the support of the 23 representatives comprising Armenia¹s two main 
opposition groups, the Artarutiun (Justice) Party and the National Unity Party 
(AMK). (9) These two leading opposition groups also stand for a greater share of 
party-list seats, maintaining that the proportional system makes electoral fraud 
more difficult; whether they will join forces with the ARF and the Orinats Yerkir 
Party is uncertain at this point.  The Artarutiun and AMK have avoided any 
involvement in electoral reform discussions due to their ongoing boycott of 
parliament sessions. (10) 
 
AZERBAIJAN 
On 18 November, the Azeri government took the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict 
outside the auspices of the OSCE Minsk Group by appealing to the U.N. to pass 
a resolution on the ongoing conflict. Azeri Foreign Minister Elmar 
Mammadyarov¹s resolution addressed the ongoing stalemate in negotiations with 
Armenia, the illegal occupation of Azeri territory by armed Armenian troops, as 
well as recent efforts to settle Armenians in seven, of the Azeri regions occupied 
by Armenia, aside from Nagorno-Karabakh. (11)  The Azeri government had 
three objectives in bypassing the OSCE Minsk Group: 1) to promote international 
interest in the conflict; 2) to inject life into the stalled peace talks between 
Armenia and Azerbaijan; 3) to demonstrate the Minsk Group¹s inefficacy in 
resolving the conflict. 
 
The Armenian government refused to accept a new framework for peace-talks 
with Azerbaijan and on 16 November Armenian Foreign Minister Vardan 
Oskanian threatened to leave the negotiations in the event of U.N. involvement.   
Oskanian warned against bringing ³new mediators² to the settlement process and 
suggested, somewhat rhetorically, that if Azerbaijan desired a ³change² in the 
format of the peace-talks, Aliyev should invite President Arkady Gukasian of the 
unrecognized republic of Nagorno-Karabakh to the negotiating table. (12)  
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The Azeri government has expressed its dissatisfaction with the Minsk Group 
repeatedly, since it considers the Russian and French co-chairs to have a pro-
Armenian bias.  The 12 July visit of the Minsk Group to the unrecognized republic 
of Nagorno-Karabakh, (13) as well as Russia¹s expansive military and economic 
treaties with Armenia have convinced the Azeri government of the Group¹s 
prejudice.  The Azeri media, far from being independent, reflect the political voice 
of the Aliyev government, and make a hobby of lambasting the OSCE Minsk 
Group about once a week.  Two particularly harsh media releases occurred 
during the political frenzy caused by President Ilham Aliyev¹s decision to appeal 
to the U.N..  On 14 November, the presenter for ³Otan Hafta,² a popular Azeri 
news show, accused the Minsk Group mediators of a ³Christian² pro-Armenian 
bias. (14)  In another instance, an editorial in the Azeri paper ³Zerkalo² criticized 
the American, Russian and French co-chairs for having ³their own geopolitical 
interests in the region² which prevented the co-chairs from expediting a 
resolution to the conflict. (15) 
 
Upon learning of Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov¹s intended 
U.N. presentation, the Minsk Group co-chairmen submitted an alternative 
resolution to Mammadyarov on 19 November. (16)   The second resolution made 
no mention of the ongoing Armenian settlement activity but rather focused on 
much needed ³investigative² efforts and fact-finding missions to ³fairly² resolve 
the conflict. (17)  Not surprisingly, Mammadyarov refused to submit this new, 
watered down resolution.  On 25 November, Mammadyarov and the Minsk 
Group co-chairmen met in New York City in a last ditch attempt to prevent the 
Azeri government from appealing to the U.N..  During the meeting, the Minsk 
Group mediators, Stephen Mann, Yuri Merzlyakov and Henry Jacquelyn, 
proposed the establishment of an independent group of experts under the 
auspices of the Minsk Group, a committee within a committee if you will, to 
investigate alleged settlement building in the occupied Azeri territories. (18) The 
Russian co-chairman Merzlyakov also apparently told Mammadyarov that it was 
a ³mistake² to submit the original resolution to the U.N. (19) Mammadyarov did 
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not heed Merzlyakov¹s warning. After hearing the Azeri Foreign Minister¹s 
presentation, the U.N. General Assembly decided to postpone voting on the 
resolution due to the U.S. representative¹s intervention.  Taking the cue from his 
Russian colleague, the American representative, while acknowledging 
Azerbaijan¹s ³pain,² stated that the concerns of the Azeri government should be 
addressed in the context of the OSCE. (20) 
 
While the Azeri media publicly eviscerated the OSCE, as demonstrated by a 
report on Azad Azarbaycan TV claiming the ³USA, France and Russia had 
thwarted² the Azeri proposal to the U.N., (21) the Azeri government swallowed 
the defeat without too much fuss.  In a 26 November press release, Azeri Deputy 
Foreign Minister Araz Azimov claimed that the Azeri government knew the 
resolution would not be adopted immediately, but expected the U.N. to vote on 
the Azeri proposal during its 59th session which will last until September 2005.  
Then, Azimov stated that the Azeri goal was to ³draw the attention of the 
international community to the artificial² settlement of Armenians in Azerbaijan¹s 
occupied territories. (22) In effect, the Azeri government never expected the U.N. 
to vote on the resolution, as it knew that the OSCE co-mediator countries, the 
U.S., Russia, and France, would never abide genuine U.N. involvement in the 
Armenian-Azeri conflict.  Rather, the Azeri government intended to create an 
international stir over the on-going situation, particularly the Armenian settlement 
build-up, and subsequently pressure the OSCE into actively and directly 
mediating the conflict. 
 
GEORGIA 
Abkhazia continues to prefer Russia over Georgia 
A last minute deal between opposition leader Sergei Bagapsh and former Prime 
Minister Raul Khajimba appears to have ended a two-month stalemate over the 
outcome of Abkhazia¹s presidential elections. Yet the pact¹s consequences for 
Abkhazia¹s relations with Georgia remain unknown. While mutual congratulations 
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have flowed from Sukhumi and Moscow, Tbilisi has maintained a tight-lipped 
silence about the compromise. 
 
Under the terms of the December 5 agreement, brokered by Russian Deputy 
Prosecutor General Vladimir Kolesnikov and Abkhaz Prime Minister Nodar 
Khazhba (a former senior Russian government official), Bagapsh and Khajimba 
will be running mates in a second presidential election to be held at an as yet 
undecided date. Plans for Bagapsh¹s inauguration, originally scheduled for 
December 6, were cancelled following announcement of the pact. 
 
Since the October 3 presidential elections in which Bagapsh claimed victory, 
Abkhazia has teetered on the brink of all-out civil conflict. Bagapsh¹s and 
Khajimba¹s armed supporters both hold government buildings throughout the 
Abkhaz capital, Sokhumi, while Bagapsh¹s militias have taken control of 
broadcast facilities.  Throughout the talks between Bagapsh and Khajimba, 
armed civilians sat vigil in front of Bagapsh and Khajimba HQs as well as near 
government buildings. (23) 
 
Commenting on the compromise, Khajimba stated that the deal should bring the 
violence to an end. ³We have agreed that we will take all the necessary 
measures . . . in order to defuse the situation,² Khajimba said. (24) Following his 
contender¹s lead, Bagapsh stated at a 5 December press conference that a 
³cabinet of national unity² would be formed after the second round of elections 
and that additional legislation would be drafted to expand the powers of the 
Abkhazian vice-president. (25) 
 
Unlike the disputed presidential election in Ukraine, Russia¹s intervention in 
Abkhazia appears to have played a successful role in tipping the scales in favor 
of its preferred candidate, Khajimba. On December 1, with Bagapsh¹s 
inauguration just five days away, an aide to the Russian Prime Minister, Gennady 
Bukayev, announced plans to suspend railway traffic with Abkhazia, terming the 
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move necessary to end ³instability² in the breakaway region. (26) The Russian 
government had already restricted border passage with Abkhazia and halted 
agricultural imports from the sub-tropical region, claiming the blockade would 
continue until Bagapsh¹s ³unconstitutional actions² ceased. (27)  The Russian-
Abkhaz border (in reality the Georgian-Russian border) closure could prove 
potentially fatal to the many Abkhaz farmers who depend on mandarin exports to 
Russia for their livelihoods.  In Tbilisi, Georgian Minister for Conflict Resolution 
Giorgi Khaindrava condemned Bukayev's threat and the Russian blockade as 
"pure blackmail," (28) while adding that Georgian authorities are ready to ship 
humanitarian aid to Sokhumi in the event of a crisis. (29)  
 
Since de facto independence from Georgia in 1993, Abkhazia has been largely 
dependent on Russia for its survival, economically and politically. While Bagapsh 
had vowed to withstand pressure from Moscow, the pact shows that Russia still 
has tremendous influence in Abkhazia and that even Bagapsh cannot stand up 
against the reality Moscow represents in Abkhaz politics; nor has Moscow been 
reticent in dictating terms. In a press conference in Sukhumi, Kolesnikov stated 
that Abkhazia should pass new electoral legislation before fresh elections can be 
held and that Abkhazia should ³report² to Moscow about the ³removal of 
difficulties² that contributed to the suspension of railway traffic. (30) 
 
Predictably, disagreements have begun to emerge already. While Bagapsh 
reportedly has insisted that new elections be held on December 26, Khajimba 
has dismissed the date as ³unacceptable.² (31) Meanwhile, Kolesnikov has 
stated that the elections should be held in January 2005. (32)  Adding to the 
confusion was a declaration by Russian Duma Vice Speaker Sergei Baburin, 
who flew to Sukhumi for talks, that both Bagapsh and Khajimba had agreed to 
hold elections no earlier than January 13. (33) So far, no official date for the 
elections has been set. It is also unclear what candidates, if any, will oppose 
Bagapsh and Khajimba in the second round of elections. 
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Opposition to the deal is widely expected. Four explosions were heard in 
downtown Sukhumi on Monday near the parliament building, but no casualties 
were reported. Bagapsh described the attack as an attempt further to destabilize 
the region. (34) 
 
Aside from domestic opposition to the pact, Georgia¹s reaction to the deal could 
prove an equally important factor. In keeping with its strategy since the 
breakaway region¹s October 3 presidential election, Tbilisi has – for now – 
eschewed all commentary on the Bagapsh-Khajimba pact. A spokesperson for 
the State Minister for Conflict Resolution stated that no plans had been made yet 
for a statement about the deal. Representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
did not respond to requests for comment. (35) 
 
Tbilisi¹s detachment, throughout November, from Abkhazian political chaos was 
intended to avoid painting Bagapsh to the Abkhaz general populace as ³pro-
Tbilisi.² Saakashvili¹s government is aware that the Abkhaz public is unwilling to 
accept any indication that Tbilisi is involved in the electoral debate between 
Bagapsh and Khajimba.  Contrary to its official rhetoric, Tbilisi may expect more 
from Bagapsh than from Khajimba, as Bagapsh represents the underdog 
opposition, a status familiar to Saakashvili. 
 
However, as Russia¹s relations with Abkhazia soured over the prospect of 
Bagapsh as president, Tbilisi began testing the waters for talks aimed at reuniting 
Abkhazia with Georgia, a principal goal of the Saakashvili administration. While 
Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili has termed the October 3 presidential 
elections ³illegitimate,² he also has expressed willingness for talks with Bagapsh, 
telling the Georgian-Abkhazian Relations Institute on December 3 that ³neither 
Georgians nor Abkhazians have any alternative to negotiations,² Civil Georgia 
reported. (36)  Saakashvili also expressed direct support for Bagapsh at the 3 
December presentation, saying that it is ³absolutely clear² that the opposition 
leader represented the ³absolute² majority of Abkhazia¹s current citizens. (37)  
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Prior to the Bagapsh-Khajimba deal, the Georgian Foreign Minister Salome 
Zourabichvili had emphasized that Tbilisi saw the December 13-14 talks of the 
United Nations group ³Friends of Georgia,² made up of the United Kingdom, the 
United States, Russia, France, Germany and Georgia, as a ³very important² 
meeting ³to avoid destabilization² in Abkhazia. (16)  However, Bagapsh stated 
that Saakashvili is ³the last person I would like to meet,² indicating he has little 
interest in constructing a functional relationship with the Georgian government. 
(38) 
 
Source Notes: 
 
(1) Arminfo News Wire, 5 Nov 04 via ISI Emerging Markets. 
(2) Eurasianet, 23 Nov 04 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(3) Ibid. 
(4) Mediamax via ISI Emerging Markets, 17 Nov 04. 
(5) Armenian Public Television, 23 Nov 04; BBC via ISI Emerging Markets. 
(6) Arminfo, 28 Nov 04 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(7) Eurasianet, 23 Nov 04 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(8) BBC Monitoring, 24 Nov 04 via ISI Emerging Markets Interfax. 
(9) ARKA News Digest, 1 Dec 04 via ISI Emerging Markets. 
(10) Arminfo, 3 Nov 04 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(11) AzerPress, 24 Nov 04 via ISI Emerging Markets. 
(12) Interfax, 16 Nov 04 via Lexis-Nexis; Vremya novostei, 16 Nov 04; What the 
Papers Say via Lexis-Nexis. 
(13) Itar-Tass, 12 July 04 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(14) ANS TV, 14 Nov 04 via BBC Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis. 
(15) Zerkalo; 26 Nov 04BBC Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis. 
(16) ITAR-TASS, 28 Nov 04 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(17) Ibid. 
(18) Azer Press News, 26 Nov 04. via ISI Emerging Markets 
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(21) Azad Azarbaycan, 24 Nov 04; BBC Monitoring via ISI Emerging Markets. 
(22) AzerPress, 26 Nov 04; BBC Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis; ITAR-TASS, 5 Dec 
04; BBC Monitoring via ISI Emerging Markets. 
(23) ITAR-TASS, 5 Dec 04; BBC Monitoring via ISI Emerging Markets. 
(24) RTR Russian TV, 5 Dec 04; BBC Monitoring via ISI Emerging Markets. 
(25) Sarke News Agency, 4 Dec 04; BBC Monitoring via ISI Emerging Markets. 
(26) RFERL online see (www.rferl.org/newsline/2004/12/2-TCA/tca-021204.asp), 
3 Dec 04; Sarke News Agency, 4 Dec 04; BBC Monitoring via ISI Emerging 
Markets. 
(27) Interfax , 2 Dec 04 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(28) Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 2 Dec 04; What the Papers Say via ISI Emerging 
Markets; RFERL Newsline, see (http://www.rferl.org/newsline/2004/12/2-
TCA/tca-021204.asp). 
(29) ³Russian Deputy Prosecutor Urges for Fresh Elections in Abkhazia² Civil 
Georgia Online News, 04 Dec 04, see 
(http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=8487). 
(30) Channel One TV, 6 Dec 04; BBC Monitoring via ISI Emerging Markets. 
(31) ³Russian Deputy Prosecutor Urges for Fresh Elections in Abkhazia,² Civil 
Georgia Online news, 05 Dec 04, see 
(http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=8487). 
(32) Interfax, 6 Dec 04 via ISI Emerging Markets. 
(33) Radio Russia, 6 Dec 04; BBC Monitoring via ISI Emerging Markets. 
(34) Rustavi-2 TV, 6 Dec 04; BBC Monitoring via ISI Emerging Markets. 
(35) ³President Sides with Bagapsh, Calls on Moscow for Restraint,² Civil 
Georgia Online News, 05 Dec 04, see, 
(http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=8479). 
(36) Ibid. 
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(38) NTV Mir Russia, 3 Dec 04; BBC Monitoring via ISI Emerging Markets. 
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Newly Independent States: Central Asia 
By Fabian Adami 
 
UZBEKISTAN 
Election update 
On 13 July this year, the US State Department made the decision to deny 
certification for $18 million in aid to Uzbekistan. According to a press release 
issued at the time, among the reasons for the decision was Uzbekistan¹s clear 
³lack of progress on democratic reform,² and the country¹s dismal human rights 
record. (1) Despite this decision, the State Department stated that US-Uzbek 
cooperation would continue. That has proven to be the case – due largely to 
Uzbekistan¹s perceived value as an ally in the Global War on Terrorism. 
 
In mid-November, Assistant Secretaries of State Laura Kennedy and Michael 
Kozak traveled to Uzbekistan for high level discussions. Kozak and Kennedy met 
with various Uzbek officials, including members of the Justice Ministry and the 
Central Election Commission. (2) During his meeting with Central Election 
Commission Chairwoman Sayyora Khujaeva, Kozak, who is Assistant Secretary 
for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, raised the issue of the difficulties being 
faced by opposition parties attempting to register for the December 26 
Parliamentary elections. (3) 
 
Only a day before Kozak¹s meeting with Khujaeva, a coalition group called Darva 
Kengashi, which is made up of three parties; Erk, Birlik and Ozod Dehqonla, 
announced that it would boycott the forthcoming election. Explaining their 
decision at a press conference, representatives of the three parties stated that 
they were withdrawing in order to draw attention to government tactics: In 
attempting to register candidates  through initiative groups, they claimed to have 
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been faced with documentation fraud, intimidation and open ³police harassment.² 
(4) 
 
As a result, Uzbek elections will take place without a ³democratic façade² such as 
existed in neighboring Kazakhstan prior to September¹s parliamentary elections 
there. All five parties which have registered: Adolat Social Democratic Party, 
Liberal Democratic Party, Milliy Tiklanish Democratic Party, Fidokorlar National 
Democratic Party and the People¹s Democratic Party, are pro-presidential 
groups. (5)  
 
Although they have withdrawn from the polls, Uzbek opposition groups have not 
been inactive. On December 1, a demonstration against President Islam Karimov 
and ³undemocratic elections² took place outside the US Embassy in Tashkent. 
Although no US officials met with the protestors, an embassy guard accepted an 
open letter to President Bush from the protestors. (6) Reports of the 
demonstration contain an interesting piece of information: While the 
demonstrators were hemmed in at all times by ³plainclothes² officers, apparently 
from the Interior Ministry, no arrests were made. (7) Moreover, no reports have 
emerged of arrests after the fact. When these events are viewed in conjunction 
with other recent occurrences, a picture emerges indicating that President 
Karimov is attempting to project a benign and democratic image in the run up to 
the election.  
 
First, under the auspices of celebrating the 12th anniversary of Uzbekistan¹s 
Constitution, Karimov signed a broad criminal amnesty. According to the 
document, criminals convicted of minor or petty offenses will receive early 
release from prison. The total number of prisoners affected is 5,040 a number 
that constitutes some 11.05% of Uzbekistan¹s total prison population.  (8) 
Significantly, the amnesty involves juveniles (those who were aged 18 or under 
when convicted), female first-offenders, men over 60 years of age and select 
others. (9)  
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Second, during his pre-election speech to Parliament, Karimov insisted that the 
polls must be free and fair, and that Uzbekistan should not ³scorn² any criticisms 
made by observing nations or organizations. (10) Karimov informed the 
parliamentary deputies that ³the experience accumulated in advanced countries 
is applicable to us,² and that ³it serves our purposes to accept all their views and 
recommendations that are critical and at the same time objective.² (11) Karimov 
moreover, promised that international observers would receive the fullest 
cooperation from the highest levels, throughout the electoral process. (12)  
 
Finally, in an interview given during an intermission from his speech, Karimov 
stated that he believed that Uzbekistan should ³abolish the death penalty² as a 
criminal sentence in the near future. (13) The motivation behind these 
announcements seems relatively clear: Karimov wishes to ³address² the 
country¹s dismal international human rights and democratic record, in order to 
mollify the US State Department and to ensure the flow of aid to Tashkent 
resumes. 
 
Kazakhstan bomb blasts 
At 7 p.m. on November 28, two explosions occurred at the Agricultural Library 
building in Almaty. The structure, which also houses the regional offices of the 
Pro-Presidential Otan party sustained minor damage only on the ground floor 
and first floor. Otan¹s offices, on the building¹s second floor, survived the blasts 
with no damage whatsoever. (14) Only one person was injured, receiving minor 
head injuries. There were no other casualties, as the Otan offices and library had 
closed for the day. (15) 
 
As yet, no indication has appeared, or at least been made public, as to who was 
responsible for the attack. It is important to note that the Almaty City Police, 
which is investigating the incident in conjunction with the Interior Ministry, has 
indicated that, at this point, the investigation¹s focus is not on terrorism, since the 
 50 
explosions were not large enough to cause serious property damage or loss of 
life, but on hooliganism and vandalism. (16) While the country¹s law enforcement 
bodies have yet to draw conclusions from the blasts, Kazakhstan¹s political 
parties have been quick to throw accusations at their opponents. 
 
On the afternoon after the attack, Otan co-Chairman Alexandr Pavlov informed 
the press that Otan had ³no comment² on the explosions. (17) A day later, 
however, Pavlov, and his co-Chairman, Amangeldi Yermegiyayev held a press 
conference during which they expressed Otan¹s official viewpoint, namely that 
the bombing had been a politically-motivated ³provocation,² designed to 
³undermine² the democratic stability of the country. (18) While they stopped short 
of naming Kazakhstan¹s opposition parties as perpetrators, they claimed that the 
attacks were carried out by ³persons or groups² who ³do not like the dynamic 
development of our state.² (19) 
 
The same day, Bolat Abilov, co-Chairman of Ak Zhol categorically denied that 
Kazakhstan¹s opposition parties had any involvement in the incident. (20) But 
Abilov expressed the viewpoint that that the government would find a way to 
accuse ³certain forces [of] organizing these explosions.² (21) Clearly, Abilov fears 
that the government will use the blasts as justification for shutting down or further 
suppressing Kazakhstan¹s opposition, especially in the 12 months between now 
and the Presidential elections in January 2006. Abilov¹s fear cannot be 
discounted. Action against the opposition has been a consistent feature in 
Kazakh politics during the last year.  In that sense, the blasts may be viewed as a 
perfect opportunity by President Nazarbaev and his loyalists. 
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